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Abstract—We model the formation of networks as a game
where players aspire to maximize their own centrality by in-
creasing the number of other players to which they are path-wise
connected, while simultaneously incurring a cost for each added
adjacent edge. We simulate the interactions between players
using an algorithm that factors in rational strategic behavior
based on a common objective function. The resulting networks
exhibit pairwise stability, from which we derive necessary stable
conditions for specific graph topologies. We then expand the
model to simulate non-trivial games with large numbers of
players. We show that using conditions necessary for the stability
of star topologies we can induce the formation of hub players
that positively impact the total welfare of the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last fifteen years, the emerging study of network
science has produced results impacting a broad variety of
dynamic systems, from biological growth to human interac-
tion [1], [2]. The recent surge in society’s dependence on
social networks places extra importance in the study of how
these networks form, grow, and eventually stagnate. Although
commonly accepted models produce some accurate network
characteristics, they rely almost purely on probabilistic meth-
ods of network growth [3]. Even the most popular stochastic
generative models like Watts and Strogatz’s small-world [4]
and Baraba´si and Albert’s preferential attachment models [5]
fall short of describing real network behavior. In contrast, we
will explain the formation of networks using game theoretic
principles, where individual “players” make rational decisions
based on maximizing an assigned payoff function under a
given information set. Applying game theory allows us to
model social behavior and interpret the resulting network
structure using the underlying economic factors that a player
might take into consideration.
In this paper, we study the dynamic formation of complex
networks where the principle source of utility for each player
comes from how central he is in the network. The concept of
centrality, as a metric, is commonly used in graph theory and
social network analysis to measure the relative importance of
a single node within a graph [6], [7]. Consequently, centrality
can be applied to networks to gauge how influential an
individual is, determine the chain of command within an
organization, or in theory, study how social constructions such
as cities form and develop. Individuals often place importance
on being in the “middle”; those with high centrality in a social
network often learn about new information before most of the
rest of the group.
There are numerous measures of centrality commonly used
in network analysis; betweenness, closeness, degree centrality
[8], and even Google’s PageRank [9], [10] are each used to
explain centrality in different contexts. In the case of degree
centrality, nodes with a higher number of direct connections
relative to other nodes in a graph are more central to the “flow”
of information, as the (unweighted) shortest paths through the
graph tend to traverse through highly central nodes rather than
less central ones. While the number of direct links is a large
factor in an node’s centrality, the number of indirect links to
a node is also important in determining the influence of a
specific node within a network. When we consider indirect
connectivity, degree centrality is not sufficient.
Introduced by Leo Katz in the 1950’s [11], Katz centrality is
a generalization of degree centrality that measures the relative
influence of a node within a network. The Katz centrality of a
node primarily depends on that node’s immediate neighbors,
but also the nodes connected to these immediate neighbors
and so on. Formally, the Katz centrality of node i is defined
as
CKi =
∞∑
k=1
n∑
j=1
αk(Ak)ij α ∈ (0, 1) (1)
Where A is the adjacency matrix of the network. Here, the
powers of k measure the presence of links through interme-
diate nodes. For example, in the matrix A2, if a13 = 1, node
1 and node 3 are connected through one immediate neighbor.
Distant links are penalized by a factor α ∈ (0, 1) that assigns
weights to each link based on the distance between the nodes.
For this definition of centrality to be meaningful, α must be
smaller than 1/λ0 where λ0 is the largest eigenvalue of the
adjacency matrix A. Assuming this, Katz centrality can be
calculated as
CK = ((I − αAT )−1 − I)1n (2)
Here AT is the transposed adjacency matrix of the network,
In is the n×n identity matrix, and 1n is a ones vector of size
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n. We use this form of centrality in order to apply our results
to directed graphs as well as undirected graphs.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The study of networks is a relatively new direction in the
game theory and network science literature [12]–[14]. Jackson
and Wolinski [15] analyzed the relationship between stability
and efficiency of simple economic networks composed of
individuals equipped with a utility function. From this, they
were able to deduce network topologies most likely to form
given a specific set of conditions related to redistributive
structures of the network. More recent work by Goyal and
Joshi [16] looked at networks resulting from the formation
of oligopolies between collaborating firms. Their research
focused on firms forming pairwise stable links, a key char-
acteristic of networks that depend on a mutual benefit to
maintain a connection. Additional work on this is extensive.
See [15], [17]–[22] and their references. In this paper we
analyze different topologies of pairwise stable networks and
the dynamics of heterogeneous link costs between players.
III. NOTATIONAL PRELIMINARIES
In this section we introduce conventional network science
and game theory notation. Assume that there is a set of
players, N = {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} where n ∈ N. A graph G is
a defined by a set of vertices (players) and edges connecting
them. If we define GN to be the complete set of all possible
adjacent edges, the set of all graphs over N is defined as
G′ = {G : G ⊂ GN}. The set of N players within a
network have relationships characterized by binary variables,
where aij ∈ {0, 1} represents this relationship between any
two players i, j. Let aij = 1 if i is directly connected
to j and 0 otherwise. The degree of a player ηi is the
number of direct connections i has in the graph, defined as∑n
j=1 aij . As is common in network science literature, we
ignore the nonsensical possibility of self loops so that aii=0.
The complete graph Kn is a graph which is defined by a
specific degree sequence ηi = n− 1, ∀ i ∈ N .
In our network formation game, we define a simple strategy
set Si = {s1i , s2i } that gives each player the ability to form
(s1i ) or veto (s
2
i ) a link with another player. We equate the
act of vetoing a link with deleting a pre-existing connection
between two players, if it exists. Let S = Πni=1Si be the set
of all possible strategy profiles. We define a network game
G(N,S, pi), where pi : S → R is a payoff function assigned to
the set of players N .
IV. THEORETICAL RESULTS
A. Objective Model
In our work, we consider a non-cooperative game structure
where a player’s objective relies on maximizing his relative
centrality while simultaneously increasing the size of the net-
work. In the context of real world networks, highly centralized
individuals often possess the largest “sphere of influence,”
which becomes most powerful when in close proximity to
a vast number of people. Specifically, we will study the
case where players attempt to maximize the probability they
are landed on by a random walk within their connected
component. We can capture this objective as:
λi = RipiKi (3)
Here λi is the benefit function equal to the number of
nodes in i’s component (minus itself) pi, multiplied by the
scaled component-wise Katz centrality of the node, Ki. This
benefit function captures an interesting trade off the player
faces between maintaining a high centrality while increasing
the size of his component. We then multiply this value by
some arbitrary award Ri a player (individuals, store, websites,
etc.) receives when another player (potentially not directly
connected) engages in an interaction with this vertex. The
centrality in the payoff function is defined as:
Ki =
CKi∑
j∈H(j) CKj
(4)
Where CKi is equal to the Katz centrality of i in the player’s
connected subgraph H(i). Our centrality measurement acts
as a probability mass that maintains a sum of one no matter
the size of the network, and so is consistent with the notion
that (all else equal) players lose centrality as the total size of
the connected network grows. To maintain consistency in the
model, we define the component centrality of an isolate node
to be equal to one. We may assume a linear cost associated
with establishing out-links:
φi =
∑
j 6=i
γijAij (5)
We assume that γij = γi, ∀j ∈ N and γi is a bilateral
fixed cost for establishing individual links for all players. The
payoff function is derived as
pii = λi − φi = RipiKi −
∑
j 6=i
γiAij (6)
From this point on, when we denote the link cost as γ
without subscript we assume that all players share a link
cost, so that γi = γ for i = 1, . . . , N . Simple marginal
analysis shows that a player i will establish a link with another
player j as long as ∆λi > γ, or the increase in the benefit
for i is greater than the linear cost associated with adding
an additional link. For an undirected graph, a link will be
made between i and j if and only if ∆pii,∆pij > 0. In this
sense, players attempt to minimize link maintenance cost while
simultaneously gaining centrality by establishing (or deleting)
links with other players.
B. Stability of Complete Graph Topologies
Pairwise stability as described by Jackson [15] is simply
defined as a network where no player benefit from creating a
new link, and no two players benefit from severing an existing
link. We assume that both players must bilaterally agree to
the creation of a link, while any player can sever a link. This
is similar to “friending” on Facebook. Under topologically-
specific conditions, complete networks and star networks are
pairwise stable using our model. In the following sections, we
construct the Katz centrality in manipulatable terms to derive
pairwise stable conditions for these network structures.
By calculating the Katz centrality as defined in (2) explicitly,
it is possible to express Ki in terms of the parameters n and α.
From this expression, pairwise stability can be defined for any
complete graph Kn and link cost γ. Lemma IV.1 summarizes
this result.
Lemma IV.1. For a complete graph Kn, the centrality vector
K is given by:
Ki =
(n− 1)α
1− (n− 1)α ·
1− (n− 1)α
n(n− 1)α =
1
n
(7)
The expression in Equation (7) defines the Katz centrality
of a vertex in a complete graph and shows that it is equivalent
to the sum of the infinite series
∑∞
k=1((n−1)α)k. We observe
that the each vertex is equally central in the complete graph
and the relative centrality of a vertex decreases harmonically
as n increases.
To prove stability, we consider the deletion of a link as the
one possible complete graph manipulation. We define a nearly-
complete graph as the graph K(−1)n with degree sequence
{n − 1, n − 1, . . . , n − 2, n − 2}. The centrality of a nearly-
complete graph can be derived from (2) by changing the
adjacency matrix so that aij = 0 for exactly one pair of
i, j ∈ N .
Lemma IV.2. For a complete graph minus one link between
two vertices, the centrality vector K(−1)n has two distinct
values Kb,Ks given by:
Kb =
(2n− 2)α+ n
(n− 2)(2nα+ n+ 1)
Ks =
2α+ 1
2nα+ n+ 1
(8)
Lemma IV.2 is illustrated in Figure 1, where we show the
two possible types of vertices in K(−1)n .
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Fig. 1. The complete graph K5 and the nearly complete graph G5,9 s.t.
a1,2=0. For high values of γ, one player benefits from a link deletion and the
complete graph loses stability. This causes a cascading effect of s2 strategy
dominance, resulting in a graph with fewer (and often zero) links.
Expression (8) shows that there are two possible centrality
values for vertices in a nearly-complete graph, where Ks is
the centrality of the two vertices with n − 2 degrees and Kb
is the centrality for all other vertices. From the expressions it
follows that the deletion of a single link in a complete graph
always results in a lower centrality and Ks < Kb.
Theorem IV.3. A complete network in which aij = 1,∀i 6=
j ∈ N will result in a pairwise stable equilibrium as long as
Ri(n− 1)(Ki −K(−1)i ) > γ.
Proof: Consider a complete graph Kn where N is the set
of n players. By definition, the graph is a single component
so pi = (n− 1), ∀i ∈ N . For the complete graph, the payoff
function can be simplified as
pi?i = Ri(n− 1)Ki − (n− 1)γ (9)
Where pi?i represents the payoff for each player i in the
complete graph Kn. If a player deviates away from pi?i by
deleting an existing link, that player’s payoff is given by
pii = Ri(n− 1)K(−1)i − (n− 2)γ (10)
If pii ≤ pi?i , than no player in Kn will benefit from deviating
from the complete structure. Thus
pi?i − pii > 0 =⇒ Ri(n− 1)(Ki −K(−1)i ) > γ (11)
From (7) and (8), we get the explicit necessary condition for
stability:
n− 1
n(2nα+ n+ 1)
>
γ
Ri
(12)
As long as this inequality holds, the complete graph is pairwise
stable and any player will receive a non-positive marginal
payoff from deleting an existing link with another player.
Note that if a fixed link cost is chosen and players are
subsequently added to the complete network, the necessary
stability inequality is violated and the complete network will
collapse and reform into smaller components.
C. Stability of Star Graph Topologies
When we study real world networks, it is difficult to find
“completeness” on a large scale; rarely does every individual
in even the closest communities form bonds with every other
individual. Networks with star topologies are a common
phenomena, appearing often in computer and social systems
aiming to optimize efficiency. In its basic form, a star graph
Sn is defined by n vertices and n+1 edges, where each “leaf”
vertex is connected to only a single “hub” vertex. We induce
the stability in star networks by choosing separate link costs δ
and ζ for leaf and hub vertices. These “tax breaks” simulate a
heterogeneous population of players found in nearly every real
world system. These non-trivial networks exhibit interesting
properties explained by their stability conditions.
Like our previous section on complete graphs, we derive
star graph centrality explicitly in terms of parameters n and
α.
Lemma IV.4. For any star graph Sn, the centrality vector
K has two possible values: Kb, the centrality of the central
vertex and Ks, the centrality of the leaves, where:
Kb =
α+ 1
nα+ 2
Ks =
(n− 1)α+ 1
(n− 1)(nα+ 2) (13)
From (13) we see that the centrality of the hub vertex is high
relative to the leaf vertices for low values of n. To determine a
pairwise stable condition we consider the result of two possible
strategies: (1) a link is added between two leaf vertices and
(2) the a leaf vertex deletes its single link with the hub vertex.
Lemma IV.5. For any single-degree vertices i, j in a star
graph Sn, if a link is formed between them, i.e., aij=1, then
the centrality K(+1)s of both vertices is given by
K(+1)s =
(n− 3)α2 + (1− n)α− 2
(n− 3)(α− 1)nα− 2n− 6α (14)
The action in Lemma IV.5 are illustrated in Figure 2
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Fig. 2. The star graph S5 and the graph G5, 5 s.t. a2,3=1. Star topologies
arise often in many network contexts. For lower values of γ, s1 strategy
dominates as leaf nodes connect with each other. The resulting stable graph
is often the complete graph.
Theorem IV.6. If the central node of a star network Sn has
a link cost ζ, while the leaves have link cost δ so that ζ ≤ γ,
then Sn is pairwise stable if for every leaf i with a link cost
δ, Ri(n − 1)(K(+1)i −Ki) < δ < Ri(n − 1)Ki and for the
hub j with a link cost ζ, Rj(n−1)Kj−Rj(n−2)K(−1)j > ζ.
Remark IV.7. Before providing the proof, we remark, we will
derive exact conditions: Ri(n−1)(K(+1)i −Ki) < δ < Ri(n−
1)Ki and Rj(n− 1)Kj −Rj(n− 2)K(−1)j > ζ.
Proof: Assume that there is a payoff function for vertex
i defined as
pii = RipiKi −
∑
j 6=i
γiAij
γi =
{
ζ if ηi = (n− 1)
δ otherwise
where Ri is a constant reward obtained by vertex i, pi is
the number of nodes in i’s component (minus itself), Ki is
the centrality of i, and ηi is the number degrees of vertex i.
Because there is only one component for a connected graph,
pi = (n− 1) for all i ∈ N . Let γi be the cost for maintaining
an existing link between i and j. In order for a star graph to
be pairwise stable, the hub must have no incentive to delete
its link between itself and a leaf, or
pii − pi(−1)i > 0 (15)
We expand this using the centrality terms defined in (13) and
(14) to show that a hub will not delete a link if
(n− 1)(α+ 1)
nα+ 2
− (n− 2)(α+ 1)
(n− 1)α+ 2 >
ζ
Ri
(α+ 1)(α+ 2)
(nα+ 2)(nα− α+ 2) >
ζ
Ri
(16)
To show that a leaf will neither delete a link or establish a
new link, we get these two necessary inequalities:
pi
(+1)
i − pii < 0
pii − piiso > 0 (17)
Where pi(+1)i is the payoff of a leaf linking with another leaf
and piiso is the payoff for an isolate node. Because an isolated
node has no neighbors, it’s payoff is zero. From this we show
that any leaf i will not disconnect from the hub if
(n− 1)2α+ n− 1
(n− 1)(nα+ 2) >
δ
Ri
(18)
and i will not link with another leaf as long as
(n− 1)((n− 3)α2 + (1− n)α− 2)
(n− 3)(α− 1)nα− 2n− 6α −
(n− 1)2α+ n− 1
(n− 1)(nα+ 2) <
δ
Ri
(19)
Rewriting these expressions in terms of variables in the payoff
function, a star graph is pairwise stable if for any leaf i:
(n− 1)(K(+1)i −Ki) <
δ
Ri
< (n− 1)Ki (20)
and for any hub j:
(n− 1)Kj − (n− 2)K(−1)j >
ζ
Rj
(21)
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We have shown that star networks are pairwise stable for
games with heterogeneous link costs between players on a
small-scale. To illustrate the complexity of real world networks
with numerous players, we have developed an algorithm that
computes possible pairwise stable game solutions given a
game definition and a specific set of parameters. The blueprint
of the algorithm is as follows:
1) Add N isolate nodes to the null network.
2) Each isolated node is given an objective function pi and
strategy set {s1, s2}.
3) Choose two nodes i, j at random from the set
{1, 2, . . . , N}. If both (either) nodes benefit from the
addition (deletion) of a link between them, the aij th
entry in the network’s adjacency matrix A is changed
to a one (zero).
4) A stable network is achieved when neither the addition
nor deletion of a single link results in a higher payoff
for all i in N .
Note that the algorithm does not assume players know which
links contribute a higher payoff compared to others, i.e., the
interactions are treated as random events between players
with imperfect information. This is an important distinction
between our model and network games proposed in previous
literature [23].
Using this algorithm, we analyze the game G(100, S, pi)
with network parameters Ri = 1, α = .0075, and γ = .25,
where pi is the payoff function defined in (6). As previously
described, the player’s objective relies on centralizing his
position in the network at the cost of fixed-price connections.
The network shown in Fig. 3 is one of many pairwise
stable topologies resulting from these parameters. Notice that
Fig. 3. A simulated pairwise stable solution for the game with N=100,
α=.0075, γ=.25. Size and color intensity is determined by the degrees of the
node.
we have multiple connected components with a single giant
component emerging from the network simulation. This is
consistent with our previous remark regarding the stability
of increasingly large single component complete networks.
Without further analysis, we infer that either players in the
smaller components cannot afford to be part of a larger
network at the cost of their current position, or (more likely)
a player in the giant component would not not benefit from
taking on an additional link with a “lesser” central player. The
pairwise stable graph shown in Fig. 3 has an average degree
of 3.56 and total payoff (
∑N
i=1 pii) of 7.50. Next we consider
an altered version of the game defined above, where a select
number of players are offered a discounted link cost. We define
the new network parameters Ri = 1, α = .0075, δ = .25,
ζ = .20, where ζ is the link cost for exactly five incentivized
players. One example pairwise stable network (shown in Fig.
4) exhibits an entirely different structure than the previously
studied network. The five players act as hubs, accumulating
a large portion of the links to form pseudo-star topologies
Fig. 4. A simulated pairwise stable solution for the game with N=100,
α=.0075, δ=.25, ζ=.20. Size and color intensity is determined by the degrees
of the node.
within the network. Over multiple simulations, we observe
that hubs only accumulate when players are offered lower
link costs compared to their peers. However, a lower link cost
does not necessarily guarantee that player becomes a hub. It
appears that the number of hubs a network can sustain exhibits
a positive correlation with the size of the network; intuitively,
a network can only sustain a few “superstar” nodes vying for
connections.
Interestingly, the incentivized network sustains an average
degree of 3.42 and a larger total payoff of 18.45. Incorporating
incentivized players in the network not only increases the
total welfare of the network, but also a number of players
without discounted link costs. From Fig. 5 we see that players
indirectly benefit from the centrality of neighboring hubs
and are thus more highly centralized in a larger component.
Representative runs are shown in Figure 5.
Fig. 5. The payoffs of 100 players with variable link costs, shown on a base
10 logarithmic scale. Note that as the margin between costs is increased, the
payoffs of hub and intermediate players increases as well.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper we have created an N -player game that
models the strategic interaction between players vying for
centrality within a dynamic system. From our objective func-
tion we derived parameter-specific (n, α, γ) conditions for
pairwise stability in the some commonly found real world
network topologies and used those to interpret our algorithm’s
empirical results. Interestingly, our research has found that
introducing incentivized players with inherent “advantages”
into the model increases the total welfare of the network
and creates a better semblance of communal structure when
compared to a completely homogeneous population of players.
In the future, we would like to analyze the results of more
complex parameter adjustments, such as implementing an
evolving cost distribution based on a player’s current position
within the network. The algorithm described in the paper can
further be adjusted to allow for games with perfect informa-
tion, where players possess more possible linking strategies to
choose from.
In addition, we would like to analyze games that produce
more realistic small-world behavior. These networks are found
in numerous social systems [24] and a complex game theoretic
model analyzing the dynamics of small-world phenomena may
be of interest.
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